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Abstract
Recently, it has been shown that deep neural networks (DNN) are subject to attacks
through adversarial samples. Adversarial samples are often crafted through adver-
sarial perturbation, i.e., manipulating the original sample with minor modifications
so that the DNN model labels the sample incorrectly. Given that it is almost impos-
sible to train perfect DNN, adversarial samples are shown to be easy to generate.
As DNN are increasingly used in safety-critical systems like autonomous cars,
it is crucial to develop techniques for defending such attacks. Existing defense
mechanisms which aim to make adversarial perturbation challenging have been
shown to be ineffective. In this work, we propose an alternative approach. We
first observe that adversarial samples are much more sensitive to perturbations
than normal samples. That is, if we impose random perturbations on a normal
and an adversarial sample respectively, there is a significant difference between
the ratio of label change due to the perturbations. Observing this, we design a
statistical adversary detection algorithm called nMutant (inspired by mutation test-
ing from software engineering community). Our experiments show that nMutant
effectively detects most of the adversarial samples generated by recently proposed
attacking methods. Furthermore, we provide an error bound with certain statistical
significance along with the detection.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been applied in a wide range of applications in recent years
and shown to extremely successful in solving problems. However, it has also been shown that even
well-trained DNN can be vulnerable to attacks through adversarial samples, especially when DNN
are applied to classification tasks [8, 19]. Adversarial samples are created with the intent to trigger
errors of the DNN. They are often crafted through adversarial perturbation, i.e., manipulating the
original sample with minor modifications so that the DNN model labels the sample incorrectly. This
is illustrated by the left part of Fig. 1. Many methods have been invented recently to craft such
adversarial samples, e.g., fast gradient sign method [8] and its variants [19], Jacobian-based saliency
map approach [25], C&W L2 attack [5] and so on [31, 29, 7, 3, 36, 24].
As DNN are increasingly used in safety-critical systems like autonomous cars, it is crucial to develop
effective techniques for defending such attacks. To counter attacks through adversarial samples,
multiple defense strategies have been proposed with the aim to improve the robustness of DNN.
Existing defenses are largely either based on the idea of adversary training [34, 26, 22, 10, 6, 11, 1,
28, 30] which works by taking adversarial samples into consideration during model training (so that
Preprint. Work in progress.
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Figure 1: Label change via perturbation on a normal sample (left) and an adversarial sample (right).
it is harder for the attackers to craft adversarial samples), or based on detecting adversary samples
by training a subsidiary model [18, 37, 9]. We contend that most existing defense strategies are
dependent on the available adversarial samples, and thus are usually limited to defend specific
attacks. That is, they provide no guarantee or confidence if the DNN is faced with a new attack.
Furthermore, it is shown in [12, 13, 14] that formally verifying DNN to provide safety guarantees is
too computationally expensive and thus would not scale.
In this work, we propose an alternative approach for efficiently detecting adversarial samples at
runtime. Our approach is based on the observation that adversarial samples are much more sensitive
to random perturbations than normal samples (i.e., those which are correctly labeled by the DNN).
That is, the probability of obtaining a different label by imposing random perturbations to an
adversarial sample is significantly higher that of imposing random perturbations to a normal sample.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1, i.e., the probability of the scenario illustrated on the right happening
is significantly more than that of the scenario illustrated on the left happening. We confirm this
observation through an empirical study with standard datasets and recently proposed adversarial
perturbation methods (refer to Section 6 for details). This observation can be intuitively explained
through a simple explanatory model.
Based on the observation, we propose the method for adversarial sample detection, which is inspired
by mutation testing developed in software engineering community. The basic idea is to measure how
sensitive a provided sample is to random perturbations and raise an alarm if the sensitivity is above
certain threshold. Through empirical study on the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset, we show that our
approach is effective against many existing attacking methods (e.g., FGSM [8], C&W [4], JSMA [25],
and Blockbox [24]). Our approach works without requiring any knowledge of the underlying DNN
system and thus can be potentially applied to a wide range of systems. It is reasonably scalable and
reliable (by providing a confidence along with the detection) compared to existing defense strategies.
We frame the rest of the paper as follows. We discuss related works in Section 2. Then we formally
define our adversarial sample detection problem in Section 3. Our observation and proposed detection
algorithm are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. Lastly, we present experiment results
in Section 6.
2 Related works
Due to the fast growing interests in this research area, many works are emerging which we are not
able to completely cover. Thus, we focus on the most relevant works in the following.
First of all, our work is devised to counter the many recently proposed attacks on DNN. These attacks
can be roughly divided into two categories, i.e., white-box attacks with access to the DNN [8, 19, 27,
36, 4] and black-box attacks without the knowledge of the DNN [23, 24, 16, 20]. Our adversarial
sample detection algorithm does not require the knowledge of the DNN and thus works in a black-box
fashion. It can be applied to defend both white-box attacks and black-box attacks.
On the defending side, one main line of work to improve the robustness of DNN is by adversarial
training, which augments training data with adversarial data and modifies the training phase so that it
is harder for the attackers to craft adversarial samples [32, 8, 15, 17, 34, 26, 22, 10, 6, 11, 1, 28, 30].
Besides adversarial training, another line of defense is to detect adversarial samples by training
subsidiary models from adversarial data [18, 37] or testing the statistical difference between the
training data and adversarial data [9].
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There are some relevant research in the software engineering community as well. Both white-box and
black-box testing strategies have been proposed to generate adversarial data more efficiently [27, 35,
33]. There are also attempts to formally verify the DNN to provide safety and security guarantees [12,
13, 14], which are however proven to be too computationally expensive and not scalable to large
DNN.
Our work falls into the category of adversary detection. However, compared to adversarial training
and prior adversary detection algorithms, our algorithm does not rely on the available adversarial
data. Furthermore, we are able to report a confidence along with the detection. Compared to formal
verification of DNN, our approach is scalable because it is based on statistical testing and randomly
mutating the given sample.
3 Problem definition
We denote the target DNN by f(X) : X → C, where X is the set of input samples and C is the set
of output labels. In this work, we assume that we do not have any knowledge of f other than that
we can obtain its output (i.e., the label) given a certain sample. Given a sample x, we denote its true
label (obtained by human observer) by cx. We say that a sample x is a normal sample if f(x) = cx
and is an adversarial sample if f(x) 6= cx. Notice that according to our definition, a sample in the
training data which is wrongly-labeled is also an adversarial sample. Our problem is then, given an
arbitrary sample x and the DNN f , how can we effectively detect whether x is a normal sample or an
adversarial sample? Can we provide some confidence for the detection result as well?
4 Mutation testing
We first present our observation on the sensitivity of mutation testing on a normal sample and an
adversarial sample. Given an arbitrary sample x for a DNN, we obtain a set of mutations Xm(x),
each of which xm = x +  is obtained by imposing a minor random perturbation  on x that is
label-preserving. We remark that we restrict the perturbations in domain specific ways to guarantee
that the mutations are realistic [27]. For example, for image recognition systems, the perturbation
can be lighting effect to simulate different intensity of lights and occlusion of a rectangle to simulate
a blocking area of a camera, etc. For every mutation xm ∈ Xm(x), we obtain its output label f(xm)
by feeding xm into the DNN.
Intuitively, for most of the mutations in Xm(x), f(xm) should be f(x) because we are imposing a
small, realistic and thus hopefully label-preserving perturbation on x. As demonstrated in previous
works [32, 8, 15], however, a label change might occur. An example of label change is illustrated in
Figure 1. The left figure takes a normal ‘cat’ image as input and the DNN correctly classifies it as a
‘cat’. After imposing a random perturbation, the DNN labels it as a ‘dog’. The right figure however
takes an adversarial ‘cat’ image (which could be either due to adversarial perturbation or training
error) as input and the DNN wrongly labels it as a ‘dog’. Then, after imposing a random perturbation,
the DNN labels it as a ‘cat’.
We calculate the sensitivity of a sample x to perturbations as follows:
κ(x) =
|{xm|xm ∈ Xm(x) ∧ f(xm) 6= f(x)}|
|Xm(x)|
, where |S| is the number of elements in a set S. Intuitively, κ(x) is the per-
centage of mutations in Xm(x) that have a different label f(xm) from f(x). To
abuse the notations, we use κnor and κadv to denote the average sensitivity of nor-
mal samples and that of adversarial samples respectively. Our observation is that
κadv is significantly larger than κnor.
Table 1 shows the κnor and κadv obtained based on the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset with different
kinds of attacks in Clverhans [21] including FGSM, C&W, JSMA and Black-box. Note that in the
case of the last column wrongly-labeled, we use those samples in the dataset which are mis-labeled
by the DNN f as “adversarial samples”. Column StepSize is a measure of the amount of perturbations
applied to the provided sample. We can observe that κnor remains a small value which is comparable
to the train error, whereas κadv is much larger than κnor for all adversarial samples generated through
different methods.
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Table 1: The confidence interval (99% significance level) of κnor and κadv of 500 images randomly
drawn from MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset with 1000 mutations each under different attacks.
Dataset StepSize κnor
κadv
FGSM C&W JSMA Black-box wrongly-labeled
MNIST
1 0.13%± 0.04% 4.86%± 0.61% 10.41%± 1.39% 6.85%± 0.58% 5.98%± 2.78% 3.68%± 0.65%
5 3.00%± 0.16% 14.82%± 0.86% 20.60%± 1.41% 15.91%± 0.93% 13.2%± 2.4% 10.32%± 0.98%
10 6.31%± 0.21% 19.34%± 1.07% 27.07%± 1.51% 21.55%± 1.11% 17.05%± 2.36% 14.47%± 1.15%
CIFAR10
1 20.91%± 3.27% 61.95%± 5.87% 54.06%± 3.45% 69.27%± 2.64% 62.00%± 7.03% 42.27%± 3.12%
5 24.30%± 3.04% 63.38%± 5.24% 56.91%± 3.13% 67.84%± 2.86% 63.55%± 6.29% 47.60%± 2.94%
10 28.30%± 2.87% 64.50%± 4.86% 59.30%± 2.87% 66.15%± 3.16% 64.92%± 5.72% 48.23%± 2.56%
Figure 2: Our explanatory model of the mutation testing effect.
Explanatory model Next, we aim to provide some intuition on the difference between κnor and
κadv. Given a normal sample x, let R(x, r) be a region around x which contains all the possible
mutations of x within a certain distance r. Our hypothesis is that the density of adversarial samples
in the region is significantly lower than the density of the normal samples. Thus, if we randomly
draw samples around an adversarial sample, we have much higher probability of sampling a normal
sample, which explains why κadv is often much larger than the training error. It is easy to see that if
the region contains all possible samples, then κnor should be close to the training error.
This simple explanation is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the distribution of normal samples
and three classes of adversarial samples crafted from different attacking methods in the input space.
The two circles are the mutation region centered around a normal sample and an adversarial sample
respectively. The densities of adversarial samples in both circles are expected to be much lower than
that of normal samples for a well-trained DNN. Thus, it is much easier to sample a normal sample
around an adversarial sample than sampling an adversarial sample around a normal one, which could
be an explanation of our observation. Note that adversarial samples outside the two circles are omitted
for simplicity.
5 Adversary detection
We design our adversary sample detection algorithm based on the above-mentioned observation. The
overview of our approach is shown in Figure 3. Given an input x to a DNN, we determine whether it
is a normal sample (i.e., f(x) = cx) or an adversarial one (i.e., f(x) 6= cx) through mutation testing.
Our detection algorithm further reports a confidence on the detection result. Once x is determined to
be an adversarial sample, we raise an alarm and avoid making wrong decisions that could lead to
severe consequences. In the following, we introduce how our algorithm works.
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Figure 3: Our adversarial input detection framework.
Algorithm 1: DetectAdv(x, f, κ1, µ, α, β, σ, StepSize)
1 Let stop = false;
2 Let c = 0 be the count of mutations that satisfy f(xm) 6= f(x);
3 Let n = 0 be the count of total mutations generated so far;
4 while !stop do
5 Randomly generate a mutation xm of x with step size StepSize;
6 n = n+ 1;
7 if f(xm) 6= f(x) then
8 c = c+ 1;
9 Calculate the SPRT probability ratio as pr;
10 if pr ≥ 1−βα then
11 Accept the hypothesis that κ(x) > µ · κ1 and report the input as an adversarial input
with error bounded by β;
12 return;
13 if pr ≤ β1−α then
14 Accept the hypothesis that κ(x) ≤ µ · κ1 and report the input as a normal input with
error bounded by α;
15 return;
The algorithm Our algorithm takes a parameter κ1 which is a threshold of sensitivity for normal
samples, a StepSize which is a measure of the amount of perturbations, along with multiple
parameters required by hypothesis testing. The basic idea of our algorithm is to use acceptance
sampling to test the hypothesis that κ(x) > µ · κ1 with strength α, β and σ, where µ is a hyper
parameter, α, β, and σ are the parameters controlling the strength and indifference region of the
test. Recall that κ(x) is the measured sensitivity of sample x. The detailed algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1.
There are two possible outcomes. If the hypothesis is accepted, it means that the sample has a higher
sensitivity than a normal sample. Thus, we report that the input x is an adversarial sample with error
bounded by β. If the hypothesis is rejected, we report that the input is a normal sample with error
bounded by α. If the test does not satisfy the stopping criteria, the algorithm continues to randomly
generate a mutation of the provided sample at line 5. The stopping criteria is calculated at line 9
whenever we observe a label change. In this algorithm, we apply the Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) to control the sampling procedure [2], where pr is calculated as
pr =
pc1(1− p1)n−c
pc0(1− p0)n−c
, with p1 = µ · κ1 + σ and p0 = µ · κ1 − σ. The algorithm stops whenever a hypothesis is accepted
either at line 11 or line 14. We remark that SPRT is guaranteed to terminate with probability 1 [2].
On termination of Algorithm 1, we either report the sample as a normal one or an adversarial one
with an error bound.
Parameter selection Next, we discuss how to set the value of κ1. First of all, we choose to test
against κnor instead of κadv because κnor is relatively stable for a given DNN, which is related to
the training error and can be empirically estimated using the training data. In contrast, κadv may
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Figure 4: The distance between κnor and κadv with different StepSize.
vary from attack to attack. The hyper parameter µ reflects the distinction between κadv and κnor.
To detect a strong attack with κadv close to κnor, we would need a small µ, and vice versa. In other
words, our algorithm provides a potential measure of the strength of different attacks by measuring
the distance between κnor and κadv for a specific attack. If the distance is large, our algorithm is able
to quickly detect an adversarial sample by setting a large µ. If the distance is small, our algorithm
may have to use a small µ and evaluate more mutations to reach a conclusion. The parameters for
SPRT are decided by how much testing resource we have, a small error bound and indifference region
would require more mutations in general. Lastly, the parameter StepSize controls how large is the
region that we generate mutations from and thus leads to different κnor and κadv. A step size is
considered to be optimal if it induces the largest distance between the resultant κnor and κadv , which
allows the algorithm to terminate early.
6 Experiments
There are several goals we want to achieve through the experiments. First of all, we aim to evaluate
our hypothesis, i.e., there is a significant difference between κnor and κadv (for different attacks).
Secondly, we aim to show that our detection algorithm is able to detect adversarial samples effectively
and efficiently. We also aim to provide some practical guidance on the choice of parameters. Lastly,
we aim to show that our algorithm improves sample labeling in general. We adopt the MNIST and
CIFAR10 datasets, and the set of attacks in Cleverhans [21] for our experimental evaluation.
Hypothesis evaluation Table 1 shows the κnor values for normal samples and κadv values for
adversarial samples obtained from multiple recently proposed attacking methods in Cleverhans [21],
which includes the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [8], the C&W attack (C&W) [4], the Jacobian-
based saliency map approach (JSMA) [25], and a practical black-box attack (BB) [24]. For each
dataset, we first randomly draw 500 images from normal samples and attempt to craft 500 adversarial
samples using each of the above attacks (notice that not all attempts are successfully and thus the
actual number of adversarial samples is less or equal to 500). Then for each image x (either normal
or adversarial), we randomly generate 1000 mutations to calculate its sensitivity κ(x). We obtain the
confidence interval of κnor and κadv by averaging κ(x) over all the images. We have the following
observations which support our hypothesis and the proposed explanatory model in Section 4.
Firstly, κnor is a small value comparable to the training error for a well trained DNN, whereas κadv
is significantly larger than κnor for all the experimented attacks. This is especially true when we set
a small StepSize (like 1) for generating mutations, in which case the four evaluated attacks has a
κadv which is 38, 72, 53 and 46 times larger than κnor respectively for MNIST dataset.
Secondly, as we increase the StepSize for generating mutations, both κnor and κadv increase
(expectedly) and the relative distance between κnor and κadv reduces. In the following, we measure
the relative distance between κnor and κadv using their ratio κadvκnor . Figure 4 shows the change of the
distance between κadv and κnor as we change the StepSize from 1,5 and 10 for mutation. We can
observe that for all the experimented attacks, a smaller StepSize results in a larger distance between
κadv and κnor (especially for MNIST). This suggests that we should prefer to use a small StepSize
in our algorithm to distinct κnor and κadv so that our algorithm can potentially terminate early.
6
Thirdly, adversarial samples crafted by different attacks have different sensitivity to random perturba-
tions. We can observe that different attack methods have different κadv values (although all of them
are significantly larger than κnor). As a result, if there is a new attack method, unlikely we are able
to know its κadv value. Thus, it is not a good idea to test against κadv. However, since 1) κnor is a
relatively stable value for a given DNN, and 2) we know that κadv is significantly larger than κnor,
we may still be able to detect a new attack by testing against κnor.
Adversarial sample detection Given an input x to a DNN, we evaluate our adversarial sample
detection algorithm using the following metrics. Firstly, how effective is the detection algorithm,
i.e., what is the accuracy (or percentage) that the algorithm successfully identifies an adversarial or a
normal sample? Secondly, how efficient is the detection algorithm, i.e., how many mutations do we
need in order to reach the conclusion?
We run our adversary detection algorithm against a set of adversarial samples crafted using different
attacks. We set the parameters in Algorithm 1 as follows. We set StepSize to be 1 since it induces
largest distance between κnor and κadv . We set κ1 to be the upper bound of the obtained confidence
interval of κnor: 0.0017 for MNIST (StepSize = 1) and 0.2418 for CIFAR10 (StepSize = 1). We
vary µ to see its effect. We set the parameters of hypothesis testing to be α = 0.05, β = 0.05 and
σ = (µ− 1) · κ1, which gives us a 95% confidence when a decision is made. Notice that we can use
a smaller α and β to obtain a higher confidence.
Table 2 shows the detailed results of our detection experiment. Column ‘κ1’ and ‘µ’ are the algorithm
parameters. Column ‘#Adversary’ is the number of successfully crafted adversarial samples from
500 attempts. Column ‘#Identified’ is the number of detected adversarial samples by our algorithm.
Column ‘Accuracy’ shows the accuracy of our detection. Column ‘#Mutations’ shows the average
number of mutations needed for a successful detection. The last column shows the average number
of label change during the detection algorithm. On average, our algorithm achieves an accuracy of
77.4% (for MNIST) and 76.6% (for CIFAR10) in terms of detecting the adversarial/normal samples
with an average 33 mutations (for MNIST) and 46.5 mutations (for CIFAR10) for each sample, which
is both effective and efficient as randomly mutating and obtaining the label of a sample is cheap.
Effect of µ. Intuitively, µ reflects how confident we are that κadv is significantly larger than κnor. A
smaller µ is preferred if we are more conservative. As we increase µ, we are able to detect adversaries
with fewer number of mutations. However, the accuracy of the detection might drop a little bit.
Wrongly-labeled samples detection. Recall that in our definition, there is no difference between
adversarial samples and benign samples which are wrongly labeled by the DNN. Thus, our algorithm
can be potentially used to detect samples which are wrongly labeled. To verify the hypothesis, we
random take 500 images from the training dataset which are wrongly labeled by the trained DNN
and evaluate their sensibility to random perturbations as well. The last column of Table 1 shows
the average κ(x) value of the randomly selected wrongly-labeled samples. We can observe that
the sensibility of these wrongly-labeled samples to random perturbations are comparable to those
generated by four kinds of attacks, which are significantly larger than the sensibility of normal
samples. We also run our algorithm against these wrongly-labeled samples (WL) and report our
detection result in Table 2. We can observe that our algorithm is able to detect these wrongly-labeled
samples effectively and efficiently similar to detecting the adversarial samples. This suggests that
wrongly-labeled samples are the same as the adversarial samples in our explanatory model from a
statistical point of view.
Normal samples detection. We also evaluate our algorithm against normal samples which are correctly
labeled by the DNN and the ‘normal’ rows in Table 2 show the detailed results. We can observe that
our algorithm also successfully identifies normal samples with high accuracy, i.e., 97.1% for MNIST
and 97.95% for CIFAR10 on average.
Discussions 1) We set the ratio of indifference region and κ1 to be µ − 1. In this case, the left
boundary of the indifference region will be κ1, which is the upper bound of the obtained confidence
interval of κnor. In practice, we could set µ according to κ1 and the size of indifference region. 2)
Decreasing α and β will improve the accuracy of the detection but require more mutations in general.
3) We achieve different accuracy on different attacks, which could be a potential measure of the
strength of the attacks and provide insight of defense against specific attacks. 4) We restrict our
mutation generation in a realistic way according to the methods in [27].
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Table 2: Detection results of 4 kinds of crafted adversarial samples for 500 attempts, 500 wrongly-
labeled samples and 500 normal samples with maximum 2000 mutations for each sample.
Dataset Attack κ1 µ #Adversary #Identified Accuracy #Mutations #lc
MNIST
JSMA 0.0017 1.2 500 475 95% 13 3.6
JSMA 0.0017 1.5 500 461 92.2% 9 2.8
JSMA 0.0017 1.8 500 463 92.6% 9 2.8
JSMA 0.0017 2 500 455 91% 6 1.92
C&W 0.0017 1.2 450 436 96.9% 13 3.7
C&W 0.0017 1.5 450 436 96.9% 9 2.8
C&W 0.0017 1.8 450 425 94.4% 8 2.8
C&W 0.0017 2 450 426 94.7% 5 1.9
FGSM 0.0017 1.2 452 366 81% 56 1.5
FGSM 0.0017 1.5 452 325 71.9% 38 1.3
FGSM 0.0017 1.8 452 284 62.8% 29 1.2
FGSM 0.0017 2 452 282 62.4% 27 1.2
BB 0.0017 1.2 174 137 78.7% 31 2.9
BB 0.0017 1.5 174 125 71.8% 18 2.3
BB 0.0017 1.8 174 127 73% 14 2.3
BB 0.0017 2 174 112 64.4% 10 1.8
WL 0.0017 1.2 247 171 69.2% 60 1.5
WL 0.0017 1.5 247 149 60.3% 38 1.3
WL 0.0017 1.8 247 146 59.1% 31 1.1
WL 0.0017 2 247 134 54.2% 28 1.2
normal 0.0017 1.2 0 18 96.4% 132 0
normal 0.0017 1.5 0 16 96.8% 84 0
normal 0.0017 1.8 0 14 97.2% 66 0
normal 0.0017 2 0 10 98% 58 0
CIFAR10
JSMA 0.2418 1.01 299 230 76.9% 72 25.6
JSMA 0.2418 1.02 299 226 75.6% 52 18.5
JSMA 0.2418 1.03 299 223 74.6% 42 15.3
JSMA 0.2418 1.04 299 223 74.6% 37 13.5
C&W 0.2418 1.01 379 215 56.7% 80 27.2
C&W 0.2418 1.02 379 213 56.2% 56 19.3
C&W 0.2418 1.03 379 210 55.4% 43 15.4
C&W 0.2418 1.04 379 214 56.4% 36 13.2
FGSM 0.2418 1.01 129 92 71.3% 68 24.6
FGSM 0.2418 1.02 129 94 72.9% 54 19.2
FGSM 0.2418 1.03 129 90 69.8% 41 15
FGSM 0.2418 1.04 129 91 70.5% 35 13.1
BB 0.2418 1.01 99 73 73.7% 69 24.7
BB 0.2418 1.02 99 71 71.7% 51 18.8
BB 0.2418 1.03 99 70 70.7% 41 15
BB 0.2418 1.04 99 67 67.7% 35 13.1
WL 0.2418 1.01 500 445 88.8% 61 23.6
WL 0.2418 1.02 500 442 88.2% 43 16.9
WL 0.2418 1.03 500 437 87.2% 35 14
WL 0.2418 1.04 500 441 88% 32 12.5
normal 0.2418 1.01 0 10 98% 48 2.3
normal 0.2418 1.02 0 11 97.8% 34 1.7
normal 0.2418 1.03 0 11 97.8% 27 1.2
normal 0.2418 1.04 0 9 98.2% 24 1.1
7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this work, we report our discovery that commonly crafted adversarial samples and normal samples
of DNN have significant different sensibility to random perturbations. We then design an algorithm
for adversarial sample detection based on mutation testing of an input sample. Our experiments show
that our algorithm is able to detect adversarial samples with high accuracy (correct detection) and
low cost (few mutations needed). Our work is not limited to a specific kind of attack or a set of
available adversarial data, but has the potential to be applied to a wide range of attacks. It can also be
potentially applied to re-label those benign samples which are wrongly-labeled by the DNN.
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